For the famous Apollo 13 near-fatal failure scenario:
‘A customer has had a fairly serious problem with stirring the cryogenic tanks with a circuit fault present. To reproduce: Build CSM; Perform mission up to translunar coast; During translunar coast, attempt to stir cryo tanks If a wiring fault exists, the issue may be replicated. Be aware that this may be hazardous to the tester attempting it.’ Sample response: ‘Does it happens only with translunar coast (sol-3-a), or any moon coasting? It may be a problem with the moon. Just trying to narrow down the issue.’
Karlin on fire:
But there’s lots in this legislation that should scare the public far more. For example, the proposal that the legislation should allow the retention of “superfluous data” gathered in the course of an investigation, which is a direct contravention of the ECJ’s demand that surveillance must be targeted and data held must be specifically relevant, not a trawl to be stored for later perusal “just in case”. Or the claim that interception and retention of data, and access to it, will only be in cases of the most serious crime or terrorism threats. Oh, please. This was, and remains, the supposed basis for our existing, ECJ-invalidated legislation. Yet, as last year’s Gsoc investigation into Garda leaks revealed, it turns out a number of interconnected pieces of national legislation allow at least 10 different agencies access to retained data, including Gsoc, the Competition Authority, local authorities and the Irish Medicines Board.