Eircom’s “DDOS”, or not

I woke up this morning to hear speculation on RTE Radio as to how Eircom’s DDOS woes were possibly being caused by the Russian mob, of all things. This absurd speculation is not helped by lines in statements like this:

‘The company blamed the problems on “an unusual and irregular volume of internet traffic” directed at its website, which affected the systems and servers that provide access to the internet for its customers.’

I’m speculating, too, but it seems a lot more likely to me that this isn’t just a DDOS, and someone — possibly just a lone Irish teenager — is running an attempted DNS cache-poisoning attack. Here’s why.

Last week, there were two features of the attack in reports: DDOS levels of traffic and incorrect pages coming up for some popular websites. To operate a Kaminsky DNS cache-poisoning attack requires buckets of packets — easily perceivable as DDOS levels. This level of traffic would be the first noticeable symptom on Eircom’s network management consoles, so it’d be easy to jump to the conclusion that a simple DDOS attack was the root cause.

This week, there’s just the DDOS levels of traffic. No cache poisoning effects have been reported. This would be consistent with Eircom’s engineers getting the finger out over the weekend, and upgrading the NSes to a non-vulnerable version. ;)

Once the attacker(s) realise this, they’ll probably stop the attack.

It’s not even a good attack for a bad guy to make, by the way. Given the timing, right after major press about a North Korean DDOS on US servers. it’s extremely high-profile, and made the news in several national newspapers (albeit in rather inept fashion). If someone wanted to make money from an attack, a massive-scale packet flood indistinguishable from a DDOS against the nation’s largest ISP is not exactly a subtle way to do it.

In the meantime, apparently OpenDNS have really seen the effects, with mass switchover of Eircom’s customers to the OpenDNS resolvers. Probably just as well…

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Links for 2008-08-12

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Links for 2008-08-09

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SpamAssassin advisory CVE-2006-2447

CVE 2006-2447, in which Radoslaw Zielinski spotted a nasty in spamd’s ‘vpopmail’ support in pretty much all recent versions of Apache SpamAssassin.

If you use spamd with vpopmail, go read the advisory and determine if you need to take action. Not many people will need to, I think; it’s a very rare setup. Still, it’s important to get the warning out there anyway.

The irony is that the bug is triggered partly by the “–paranoid” switch. This was intended to increase security, by increasing paranoia when possibly-unsafe situations arose — hence providing a great demonstration of how the addition of optional code paths, even in the best intentions, can reduce security by allowing bugs to creep in unnoticed.

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Email Injection attacks in PHP via mail()

Apparently, spammers are now exploiting a hole, or holes, in multiple PHP scripts which use the mail() API.

The holes are described at the SecurePHP wiki; basically, the script author inserts CGI fields directly into a message template without stripping newlines, and this allows attackers to create new headers, take over the message body, and generally take over the mail message and destinations entirely.

Funnily enough, these are the same holes Ronald F. Guilmette and I found in FormMail 1.9, and described in our Jan 2002 advisory Anonymous Mail Forwarding Vulnerabilities in FormMail 1.9 (PDF) on page 10, Exploitation of email and realname CGI Parameters. Ah, plus ca change…

Worth noting that perl’s venerable taint checking would have spotted these, if it were used.

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