Bank of Ireland: “we don’t understand fraud”

Check out this logic from the Bank of Ireland, spotted by waider in today’s news:

Last week, the bank said that medical records, bank account details, names, addresses and dates of birth of 10,000 customers were on the laptops. [...]

Bank of Ireland said an assessment had concluded that the risk of fraud arising from the thefts was ‘very low’, as the data on the laptops did not include bank account passwords, PINs or copies of signatures.

So a fraudster would have medical records, bank account details, names, addresses and dates of birth of 10,000 customers, but the risk of fraud is ‘very low’? Incredible.

Update: make that 30,000 customers.

Update 2: 31,500 customers, and a sample letter.

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Bank of Ireland’s 10,000-customer security breach

Bank of Ireland, one of Ireland’s biggest high-street banks, was the subject of a breach notification yesterday — 4 laptops, containing unencrypted “sensitive personal information” about up to 10,000 customers, were stolen between June and October 2007. It seems the Irish Data Protection Commissioner was not informed until last Friday. The Financial Regulator is also looking into the incidents.

According to the Independent, the laptops ‘were being used by staff working for Bank of Ireland’s life assurance division. They contained the information about medical history, life assurance details, bank account details, names and addresses.’

This breach has raised quite a few issues.

First off, I was watching Questions and Answers last night, and was shocked by the naivete of the assembled panel. One panelist, for example, reckoned that common criminals wouldn’t understand the value of this data — so it was probably nothing to worry about!

There was absolutely no concept of how widespread identity theft has become — using stolen identity information to apply for credit cards is part of Petty Theft 101 these days, since filling out forms is a lot easier than breaking and entering, obviously. There was also no appreciation of how little protection Irish consumers have in this regard with current Irish banking T&Cs.

According to previous research, about 2% of accounts compromised in data breaches become victim to identity theft.

Some comments from the bank from those articles:

‘The data was not encrypted, although it is understood there was software security installed on the stolen computers.’

Doubtless, “software security” refers to some kind of useless Maginot Line boondoggle like Norton Internet Security. This would have absolutely no useful effect in this case. The only useful way to protect customer data on a stolen laptop is to use encrypted storage.

‘In the interim the bank has monitored all of these customer accounts and can confirm that there has been no evidence of fraudulent or suspicious activity.’

This is a fallacy. This data provides plenty of information regarding the customer’s identity — information which is useful to receive loans and credit fraudulently, elsewhere. Monitoring the bank’s accounts is of no help in that case. On top of that, identity information like your date of birth, mother’s maiden name, health status, and so on doesn’t expire — that info will still be useful for identity theft, 10 years from now, or as a stepping-stone to further fraud.

As John O’Shea noted on Twitter earlier, there was nothing on their website about it this morning; there is now, however — a broken link on the front page. oops!

Figuring out the puzzle and fixing the URL’s errors gets you to this page, which notes:

The laptops contained information relating to some customers who either obtained a quote or took out a Life Assurance policy with Bank of Ireland Life from the following branches:

  • Drogheda
  • Dunleer
  • Bagnelstown
  • Court Place Carlow
  • Stephens Green
  • Tallaght
  • Montrose

Anybody who is not a customer of these branches is not affected by this incident.

As far as I can make out, the bank didn’t issue this breach notification. It appears from the coverage that this information was first announced by Data Protection Commissioner Billy Hawkes to RTE yesterday, leaving the bank apparently scrambling to catch up:

“The thefts of the laptops were only brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities in the bank in the past number of weeks,” Bank of Ireland said in a statement that offered no other explanation for the long delay.

It would have been so much better if BoI had been proactive with breach notification — examples from overseas have illustrated its value. As Adam Shostack has noted repeatedly over the past few years: the rules have changed.

As for repercussions for BoI, it’ll be interesting to see if anything happens. For “live” customer data on up to 10,000 customers to be stored, in unencrypted form, on a laptop is terrible security practice — but as far as I know, there are no laws or regulations requiring anything better in Ireland, unfortunately. :( However:

Consideration will be given as to what further action will be sought from Bank of Ireland to ensure that the obligations contained in the Data Protection Acts in this area are met.

On a broader level, this issue serves to highlight once again the absolute necessity for all organisations in the public and private sector to take their data protection responsibilities seriously. In particular, all organisations should be assessing immediately the necessity for storing personal data on laptops. If a need is found, appropriate security measures such as encryption should be put in place immediately.

Go Billy! ;)

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Liability for internet banking fraud in Ireland

Steven Murdoch at Light Blue Touchpaper notes that the UK banking code now includes wording to make the customer liable for losses attributable to them “acting without reasonable care”, where “reasonable care” bizarrely includes installing anti-virus software on their PCs.

The Register also picked up on this, as did Brian Krebs in the Washington Post, comparing it with the vastly superior customer protection offered by the US banks.

I was curious, so I went looking at the Irish situation. Needless to say, it’s not pretty.

I couldn’t find anything in the Irish Banking Federation’s Code Of Practice for Personal Customers, unfortunately. However, AIB’s terms and conditions for use of their Internet Banking product contain this:

5 Transactions on the Account:

5.1 The User authorises AIB to act upon any instruction to debit an Account received through AIB Phone & Internet Banking which has been transmitted using all or part of the Registration Number, PAC and/or any other authentication process which AIB may require to be used in connection with AIB Phone & Internet Banking (including but not limited to a Code Card) without requiring AIB to make any further authentication or enquiry, and all such debits shall constitute a liability of the User. Where the User’s Account is maintained in joint names the liability of the Account Holders shall be joint and several.

5.6 Entries in an Account in respect of Bill Payments, Fund Transfers and Top-Ups shall be prima facie evidence that the transfer or debit represented thereby has been duly authorised and shall be binding on AIB and the User unless and until proved to the contrary.

6 International Payments:

6.9 To the extent permitted by law, and notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein, AIB shall not be liable for, and shall be indemnified in full by the User against, any loss, damage or other liability that the User or AIB may suffer arising out of or in connection with the User’s use of the International Payment services (whether as the sender or receiver of an International Payment) unless such loss, damage or liability is caused by AIB’s fraud, wilful default or negligence. In no circumstances will AIB be liable for any increased costs or expenses, or for any loss of profit, business, contracts, revenues or anticipated savings or for any special, indirect or consequential damage of any nature whatever.

As far as I can tell, basically the AIB have no liability here at all — if a bad guy gets hold of your PIN code and account number, and empties your account, tough luck.

What about Bank of Ireland? It seems they agreed to refund phishing losses in an incident back in 2006. But their 365online Terms and Conditions now say this:

13 Indemnity

13.2 Without prejudice to the generality of Clause 13.1 above, the Bank shall have no liability whatsoever in respect of any loss suffered by the Customer as a result of their breach of Clause 4 [jm: Security/Authentication] by way of knowingly, negligently or recklessly disclosing the Security Devices or any of them.

So it’s all pretty bad news for Irish banking customers. This is pretty bad news — it’s only a matter of time before Irish banks are targeted by a new Banking Trojan, and given that antivirus software has an 80% miss rate these days, even having an up-to-date AV scanner isn’t going to be much help.

My answer? Don’t do internet banking on Windows machines. Simple as that.

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The Haughey 419 returns

A few months back, Blogorrah noted an amazing 419 scam, claiming to be a missive from ex-Taoiseach of Ireland Charlie Haughey’s wife, Maureen. It’s really quite appropriate Charlie becoming the subject of a scam himself, given what he did to this country. But anyway… over the weekend, a new variant on the theme emerged:

From Mrs Maureen Haughey, ROI

My Dear Friend,

I am Maureen Haughey, widow of former Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland, Charles J. Haughey and daughter of former Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland and heir to de Valera, Sean F. Lemass.The Press has written a lot about unresolved mysteries and corruption surrounding CharlesÂ’s dealings, but I tell you something,my Charlie was a good man. He was human and he did whatever he did.

People marvel why I stuck with Charlie and didn’t speak during the mess that came with the exposure of his affairs with Terry Keane (I just hate to think of her). I had to stand by him through the tribunal times…. it was to do with what I’m doing now. No one knew the details of all Charlie’s financial dealings but me. I remain the only one who knows all who got loans from Charlie and didn’t come back to pay when he was disgraced. I am the only one who knows about these monies and the other Ansbacher accounts.

I write to you, an old weary woman, sick and almost tired of living. My end is near but I will not depart until my final mission is accomplished and I also write this with an unshaken belief in the power of aspirations and dreams of a human being. The Irish government thinks it can shave and reduce me to a poor widow but I have the winning ace. A few years ago, when we werenÂ’t sure if my Charlie would be convicted, he kept some money in trust for me in a Security and Finance company. He did not open the account in our names so it will not be traced to us to enable the past remain the past. The name on the account is Cedric de Vregille. I never thought Charlie would leave me so soon and it never occurred to me to ask if this name were fictitious or not or a name of any of his friends. I have tried to find this man but to no avail. The amount he deposited in this name is 30,000,000 (Thirty Million Euros).

I want an honest person to come forward and lay claims to this amount, moreover to use the funds as instructed by me. I have all the documents needed, I just need a face for the name. I have mapped out 30% of the funds for you, as you will help us (you and I) execute this job.

As soon as I receive your acceptance for this work I shall give you necessary details of my solicitor who will facilitate the release of the funds in your name. Please reply me via my personal email: maureen_haughey67@yahoo.co.uk


For my security and the sake of letting sleeping dogs lie, I strongly advice that you keep our dealings confidential. You can read more about my charlie from:

http://www.ireland.com/focus/haughey/ITstories/story11.htm

http://www.teachersparadise.com/ency/en/wikipedia/c/ch/charles_haughey.html

http://www.everything2.com/index.pl?node_id=548983&lastnode_id=0

Thank You.


Message sent using UebiMiau 2.7.2

It was sent via a webmail system at nildram.co.uk, from a proxy in Australia.

The writing is amazingly ornate — ‘I write to you, an old weary woman, sick and almost tired of living’, ‘the Irish government thinks it can shave and reduce me to a poor widow but I have the winning ace’, etc. Very odd stuff. Also, it looks spell-checked. And, once again, poor old cyclist Cedric de Vregille gets dragged into it, too! I wonder what he did to deserve that ;)

If you fancy scambaiting, ‘maureen_haughey67@yahoo.co.uk’ is the one to go for. These guys seem to be having a good go of it‘The thought of the Irish government trying to shave an old woman has shocked and appauled me, so I will assist in anyway possible.’ ha!

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UK ATM fraud in the 1990s

The Register: How ATM fraud nearly brought down British banking. This story is mind-boggling; it claims that UK ATM security had two major issues that have been kept secret since the 1990s:

  • An insecure data format used for the data on the magnetic stripes in one bank’s cards;

  • Another bank’s computing department “going rogue”, “cracking PINs and taking money from customers’ accounts with abandon” as the story puts it. Yikes.

The latter problem is scary, but in my opinion the former problem is more interesting from a computer security point of view.

This is a classic example of bad data format design, as it left the PIN and the account details individually rewritable — in other words, an attacker could (and did) change one while keeping the other intact.

This British Computer Society abstract provides more details on the who, how and where:

… it was revealed that UKP 130,000 had been stolen from Abbey National cardholders during 1994 and 1995 with counterfeit cards. Andrew Stone, a bank security consultant who had been advising Which?, the magazine of the Consumers’ Association, was jailed for five and a half years for the theft. This fraud involved spying on Abbey customers as they used their cards in automated teller machines (ATMs) or cash dispensers… [Stone] recorded card details and personal identification numbers (PINs) using powerful video cameras. The details were then encoded on the magnetic strips of other cards.

Finally, another quote from the Reg story:

why is he telling this explosive story now? Because chip and PIN has been deployed across the UK ATM network. “The vulnerability in the UK ATM network was still there to be exploited — if someone had chanced upon it.”

I wonder if other banking systems worldwide are still vulnerable, however? Did any other banks elsewhere license the vulnerable systems from UK banks, without knowing about these vulnerabilities? How long did it take for them to be fixed, if they were fixed?

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E-Voting shenanigans in Riverside

E-Voting: Paul Krugman: Fear of Fraud:

It’s election night, and early returns suggest trouble for the incumbent. Then, mysteriously, the vote count stops and observers from the challenger’s campaign see employees of a voting-machine company, one wearing a badge that identifies him as a county official, typing instructions at computers with access to the vote-tabulating software.

When the count resumes, the incumbent pulls ahead. The challenger demands an investigation. But there are no ballots to recount, and election officials allied with the incumbent refuse to release data that could shed light on whether there was tampering with the electronic records.

This isn’t a paranoid fantasy. It’s a true account of a recent election in Riverside County, Calif., reported by Andrew Gumbel of the British newspaper The Independent.

Here is Gumbel’s account. It’s quite simply crazy:

On March 4, Floyd and Cassel saw the second Sequoia employee, Eddie Campbell, return to the registrar’s office and watched him pop into his pocket what looked like a PCMCIA card similar to those used to store votes on individual touchscreen machines. The Sequoia AVC Edge machines do not make a paper record of individual votes, and any record of total votes for a potential recount — vital in a race separated only by 45 votes — would only be stored on that kind of card.

Floyd shouted out: ‘Where are you going with that?’ But he received no answer.

Incredible.

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